What’s happened over the past 10 years to the selection of retired CEOs as board members?

I analyze directorships held by CEOs who retired during 1989-1993 and during 1998-2002. My results suggest that retired CEOs became more popular on boards. Also, although pre-retirement accounting performance helps explain the number of outside directorships a retired CEO held in the 1989-1993 sample as Brickley, Linck, and Coles (1999) found, it does not in the 1998-2002 sample. Third, a company's stock performance during a CEO's tenure affects whether he became an inside director of that company after retirement. A 25% change in stock price performance increased the probability by 11% in the 1989-1993 sample, and 51% in the 1998-2002 sample. Finally, if a retired CEO worked in a regulated industry, his probability of serving at least one outside directorship fell by 34% in the 1989-1993 sample, and 24% in the 1998-2002 sample.Corporate governance, Board of director, Deregulation

Where do the talented people work as outside directors?

Revised version of http://hdl.handle.net/2022/1817This paper develops a matching model in the director market with outside options to explain the equilibrium board quality. Based on Hermalin (2005) and Gabaix and Landier (2006), the board of directors has the function of monitoring and advising to affect the earning of firm assuming that the impact of a CEO's quality increases with the size of the firm under his control. This model shows that the big firms make board positions more attractive compared to outside options. Also, only when the impact of the advising by the board is strong, the more talented CEO can induce the high qualified outside directors. It follows that the board quality increases. Additionally, the model can explain the observed fact that the quality of directors on the same boards is dispersed. The estimations suggest that the talented ongoing CEOs and retired CEOs go to the firms which have the high market capitalization values and the large amount of sales. The evidence for the effect of the incumbent CEO's talent is mixed. I also find that the firms which have a large amount of sales pay more to outside directors. The compensation for directors, however, does not affect the quality of boards

Comparison of Antibacterial Activity of Ozonated Olive Oil and Chlorhexidine Gluconate

Aim: The aim of this in vitro disk diffusion susceptibility test is to compare the antibacterial activity of ozonated olive oil (OzOO) with chlorhexidine gluconate (CHX) against periodontal pathogens, Porphyromonas gingivalis and Aggregatibacter Actinomycetemcomitans. Materials and Methods: The antibacterial activity of two antiseptics, OzOO and CHX, and, two controls, olive oil and normal saline was assessed by disk diffusion susceptibility test. For disk diffusion susceptibility test, two periodontal pathogens, 20 petri dishes for P. gingivalis and 18 petri dishes for A. actinomycetemcomitans, were used. To assess the antibacterial activity, the diameters of the growth inhibition zone were measured with a caliper. Results: The diameters of the growth inhibition zone against P. gingivalis were 31.4 ± 5.05 mm for OzOO and 20.9 ± 1.19 mm for CHX (p\u3c0.001). The diameters of the growth inhibition zone against A. actinomycetemcomitans were 25.9 ± 1.69 mm for OzOO and 18.4 ± 1.55 mm for CHX (p\u3c0.001). All the measured diameters for olive oil and normal saline against both periodontal pathogens were 6 mm, with no sign of the growth inhibition. Conclusion: The antibacterial activity of OzOO against P. gingivalis and A. actinomycetemcomitans is superior to that of CHX

What’s happened over the past 10 years to the selection of retired CEOs as board members?

I analyze directorships held by CEOs who retired during 1989-1993 and during 1998-2002. My results suggest that retired CEOs became more popular on boards. Also, although pre-retirement accounting performance helps explain the number of outside directorships a retired CEO held in the 1989-1993 sample as Brickley, Linck, and Coles (1999) found, it does not in the 1998-2002 sample. Third, a company's stock performance during a CEO's tenure affects whether he became an inside director of that company after retirement. A 25% change in stock price performance increased the probability by 11% in the 1989-1993 sample, and 51% in the 1998-2002 sample. Finally, if a retired CEO worked in a regulated industry, his probability of serving at least one outside directorship fell by 34% in the 1989-1993 sample, and 24% in the 1998-2002 sample

Where do the talented people work as outside directors?

This paper has been revised. The revised version is at http://hdl.handle.net/2022/1839This paper develops a matching model in the director market with outside options to explain the equilibrium board quality. Based on Hermalin (2005) and Gabaix and Landier (2006), the board of directors has the function of monitoring and advising to affect the earning of firm assuming that the impact of a CEO's quality increases with the size of the firm under his control. This model shows that the big firms make board positions more attractive compared to outside options. Also, only when the impact of the advising by the board is strong, the more talented CEO can induce the high qualified outside directors. It follows that the board quality increases. Additionally, the model can explain the observed fact that the quality of directors on the same boards is dispersed. The estimations suggest that the talented ongoing CEOs and retired CEOs go to the firms which have the high market capitalization values and the large amount of sales. The evidence for the effect of the incumbent CEO's talent is mixed. I also find that the firms which have a large amount of sales pay more to outside directors. The compensation for directors, however, does not affect the quality of boards

Where do the talented people work as outside directors?

This paper develops a matching model in the director market with outside options to explain the equilibrium board quality. Based on Hermalin (2005) and Gabaix and Landier (2006), the board of directors has the function of monitoring and advising to affect the earning of firm assuming that the impact of a CEO's quality increases with the size of the firm under his control. This model shows that the big firms make board positions more attractive compared to outside options. Also, only when the impact of the advising by the board is strong, the more talented CEO can induce the high qualified outside directors. It follows that the board quality increases. Additionally, the model can explain the observed fact that the quality of directors on the same boards is dispersed. The estimations suggest that the talented ongoing CEOs and retired CEOs go to the firms which have the high market capitalization values and the large amount of sales. The evidence for the effect of the incumbent CEO's talent is mixed. I also find that the firms which have a large amount of sales pay more to outside directors. The compensation for directors, however, does not affect the quality of boards.Corporate governance, Board of director, Job search, Matching

Korean Code of Ethics for Attorneys

In 2009, Korea implemented a law school educational system, which not only changed the legal education system, but the legal landscape as a whole. This has led to rapid growth in the number of attorneys. Although the increased number of attorneys has resulted in lower barriers to accessing justice, it has also brought the unintended consequence of cut-throat competition. With the number of disciplinary actions rising by four-fold in the last three years, the current version of the Korean Code of Ethics for Attorneys is certainly a step in the right direction but may not be enough to strengthen attorneys’ legal ethics in such an unprecedented time in Korean legal history. In light of the heated discussion in Korea regarding legal ethics, this comment, following the accompanying translation of the Korean Bar Association’s Code of Ethos for Attorneys, first, analyzes how the Korean legal education system and legal ethics education has changed over time. Second, to provide context on how the current Code of Ethics reached its current form, this comment reviews the history of and recent amendments to the Code of Ethics. Lastly, it considers next steps for the Code of Ethics and how attorneys can have a better sense of legal ethics in the long term. This comment is for those interested in comparative legal ethics, Korean legal ethics, and the Korean legal system

Public Pensions and Capital Accumulation: The Case of Brazil

We use an OLG model to study the effects of the generous public sector pension system in Brazil. In our model there are two types of workers, one working in the private sector, the other working in the public sector. Public workers produce infrastructure or education services. We find that reducing generosity of the public sector pensions has large effects on capital accumulation and steady state income.pension reform, capital accumulation

Did Japanese direct investment in Korea suppress indigenous industrialization in the 1930s? : evidence from country-level factory entry patterns

Foreign direct investment (FDI) can deliver both positive and negative spillovers to the local economy. Negative effects such as crowding-out or entry-barrier effects might outweigh the positive ones when the technological gap between foreign and local firms is significant. This paper examines the impact of Japanese direct investment into Korea under colonization in the 1930s on the entry of Korean-owned factories. By using the census of manufacturing factories in Korea, we exploit variations in the share of Japanese factories and their entry rates across counties within the same subsectors. We find that within a subsector, entry rates of Korean factories were higher in counties with higher presence and entry of Japanese factories. Positive correlations are also found between subsectors. The results imply that Japanese direct investment did not suppress the entry of Korean factories and that FDI could exert positive entry spillovers on indigenous firms, even at a very early stage of industrialization